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REGULATING DUAL USE RESEARCH TO PROMOTE PUBLIC 
TRUST: A REPLY TO DR. FRANZ 
ROBERT GATTER* 
Elsewhere in this issue, Dr. David Franz makes a persuasive argument 
that protecting the public against risks posed by dual use research of 
concern (DURC)1 requires strong leadership among scientists who manage 
the laboratories in which such research takes place.2 Among other things, 
he calls on scientists, regulators, and others interested in DURC oversight to 
devote as much attention to developing stronger laboratory leadership as 
has been spent on creating rules and regulations.3 
Importantly, Dr. Franz is skeptical of the government’s regulating 
scientists and research institutions, including the newly proposed federal 
rules concerning DURC.4 He writes that regulations cannot make us safe in 
the face of dual use risks and that, instead, they create compliance tasks 
that distract scientists and divert resources from research.5 
More fundamentally, Dr. Franz depicts life science research as “over-
regulated” and argues that such regulation is antithetical to maintaining 
 
* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Health Law Studies, Saint Louis University 
School of Law. Thank you to Dr. David Franz for sharing his experience, his intellect, and his 
open-minded curiosity with me as I developed the theme for this essay based on conversations 
with him as part of planning the symposium Regulating Dual Use Research, at the symposium, 
and while driving to the airport at its conclusion. He makes intellectual curiosity and public 
service a way of life. 
 1. “Dual Use Research of Concern” is “life sciences research that, based on current 
understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or 
technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a significant threat with broad potential 
consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the 
environment, material, or national security.” NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH POLICY ON 
MITIGATING RISKS OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN (2013), http://grants.nih. 
gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-13-107.html. 
 2. See David R. Franz, Dual-Use Dilemma: Crying Out For Leadership, 7 ST. LOUIS U. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 53-56 (2013). 
 3. Id. at 51-53. 
 4. See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 1. 
 5. See Franz, supra note 2, at 50 (“At least anecdotally, compliance with these 
regulatory approaches has forced laboratories to hire additional contractors to manage the 
programs, which has diverted funds from legitimate research, subsequently slowing progress. 
Even with these regulations in place, the U.S. Government cannot assure increased security.”). 
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laboratories as “communities of trust” in which safe and productive research 
can take place.6 Indeed, this is the closing message of his article. After 
acknowledging that regulations are necessary to establish “the boundaries 
of the playing field and the rules of the game,” he observes that, in the 
context of DURC, “[t]he safety rulebook in a high-containment infectious 
disease laboratory is thick . . . .”7 Moreover, he explains that many of the 
rules respond to the conduct of very few bad actors, and yet those rules 
apply to every scientist and lab worker.8 From this, Dr. Franz warns that, 
“[w]hen rules for the few become too disruptive to the work of the many, 
communities of trust can break down.”9 Meanwhile, “[l]aboratories with 
exceptional leaders armed with well thought-out, and thin . . . rulebooks,” 
he says, “will always be safer, more secure, and far more productive than 
labs where the many are overregulated . . . .”10 
Dr. Franz’s observations bring into play a complicated relationship 
between regulation and trust, which has significant implications for how the 
law should be used to steer conduct with respect to DURC in life science 
research. Both trust and regulation are necessary components to the 
research enterprise. I defer to Dr. Franz’s view that trust among laboratory 
workers and scientists is vital to safety and productivity. Equally vital, 
however, is public trust in researchers and research institutions. Put another 
way, it is not enough for scientists to trust each other and the leadership of 
their research institutions; the research enterprise generally must also be 
trustworthy to the public at large. 
Controversy over the publication of two studies in which scientists 
manipulated the genes of a certain strain of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza (H5N1) to create new pathogens that are easily transmissible 
among ferrets (a model for human influenza transmission) draws into 
question the trustworthiness of researchers and research institutions.11 This 
research involved significant risks to public safety by creating new and 
potentially virulent pathogens that could be accidentally released or 
misused, and demonstrated methods for creating other potentially 
dangerous pathogens, which could be misused in war or bioterrorism.12 Yet, 
it does not appear that those risks were acknowledged or discussed by the 
 
 6. Id. at 12. 
 7. Id. at 57. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Franz, supra note 2, at 57. 
 11. See id. at 43. 
 12. See id. 
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scientists or research institutions involved until just before the studies were to 
be published, and then only when outsiders raised questions.13 
Under these circumstances, regulators, legislators, news media, and 
voters are more than justified to question whether research oversight is 
sufficient to assure public safety. The public may fairly interpret the story of 
the ferret flu studies as an example of how a single-minded drive toward 
discovery can blind scientists to the full measure of the risks their work 
imposes on the public. 
The ferret studies were designed to create new influenza strains that 
were not only highly pathogenic, but also easily transmissible between 
mammals.14 It was no surprise, then, that each of the studies resulted in new 
strains of H5N1 that were transmitted between ferrets.15 Given the risks 
inherent in the objectives and design of these experiments, why were the 
public safety risks not discussed and compared to the benefits of the 
research until the eleventh hour prior to publication, well after the studies 
were completed? Why did the lead researchers not present a risk-benefit 
analysis as part of their research proposals? Why did their research 
institutions not require such a risk-benefit analysis as a condition for 
allowing the studies to be conducted on their premises? Why did the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) approve government funding for each of 
the studies without first conducting a risk-benefit analysis and without first 
questioning whether the value of two studies was worth doubling the safety 
risks to the public? 
The thesis of this essay is that a discovery imperative lies at the core of 
science, that this drive to discover causes scientists to undervalue research 
risks, and that public trust in life sciences research requires a regulatory 
check on that bias. Despite Dr. Franz’s observation that research regulation 
diminishes trust within laboratories, I argue that the right kind of regulation 
will create a foundation for public trust in researchers and their institutions. 
Moreover, I claim that the newly proposed DURC regulations are the right 
kind of regulation. 
A. The Ferret Studies, Their Approval, and Their Publication 
In 2012, two different research teams completed similar experiments 
proving that H5N1 is susceptible to genetic modifications that will make it 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Sander Herfst et al., Airborne Transmission of Influenza A/H5N1 Virus Between 
Ferrets, 336 SCI. 1534, 1539 (2012); Masaki Imai et al., Experimental Adaptation of an 
Influenza H5 HA Confers Respiratory Droplet Transmission to a Reassortant H5NA/H1N1 Virus 
in Ferrets, 486 NATURE 420, 427 (2012). 
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easily transmissible among humans.16 As an avian influenza, H5N1 most 
commonly infects a variety of domestic and wild birds.17 Yet, it is capable of 
leaping the species barrier to infect humans.18 To date, more than 600 
human infections have been recorded worldwide with a mortality rate of 
close to 60%.19 Despite these infections, there has not been an outbreak of 
H5N1 among humans because the strains of H5N1 involved in these 
infections were not easily transmitted from human-to-human through, for 
example, sneezing.20 This led some scientists to question whether H5N1 
poses much of a pandemic threat.21 These scientists hypothesized that the 
genetic alterations necessary to permit an avian H5N1 to both infect a 
human and to become easily transmissible among humans are so numerous 
as to be highly unlikely to ever occur in nature.22 To address this hypothesis, 
the two research teams designed experiments to identify what, if any, genetic 
modifications to H5N1 would make it easily transmissible among humans.23 
Both of the studies were funded in part by the National Institute of 
Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), which is the division of NIH 
responsible for influenza research.24 Yet, the funding review at NIH and 
NIAID was purely scientific and was unlikely to have included any 
assessment of the dual use risks posed by either project. Federal regulations 
provide that NIH assess “the scientific merit and significance of the project, 
the competency of the proposed staff . . . the feasibility of the project, the 
likelihood of its producing meaningful results, the proposed project period, 
and the adequacy of the applicant's resources available for the project 
. . . .”25 Likewise, grant application guidelines under the NIAID state that 
reviewers should judge an application solely on “its ability to make a strong 
 
 16. See Herfst et al., supra note 15, at 1541; Imai et al., supra note 15, at 420. 
 17. Q&A on Avian Influenza, EUROPEAN CTR. FOR DISEASE PREVENTION & CONTROL, 
http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/avian_influenza/basic_facts/Pages/QA-avian-influen 
za.aspx (last visited October 23, 2013); Avian Influenza: Brief Background, UNIV. OF 
MINNESOTA CTR. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESEARCH & POLICY, http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/ 
infectious-disease-topics/avian-influenza-bird-flu#overview&1-3 (last updated June 12, 
2013). 
 18. Avian Influenza, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/ 
avian_influenza/en/index.html (last updated April 2011). 
 19. See Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A (HPAI) in People, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/h5n1-people.htm (last updated June 
21, 2012). 
 20. See The Writing Comm. of the World Health Org., Avian Influenza A (H5N1) 
Infection in Humans, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1374, 1375 (2005). 
 21. See Herfst et al., supra note 15, at 1535. See also Imai et al., supra note 15, at 420. 
 22. See Herfst et al., supra note 15, at 1535; Imai et al., supra note 15, at 420. 
 23. See Imai et al., supra note 15, at 420. 
 24. See id. at 428; Herfst et al., supra note 15, at 1541. 
 25. 42 C.F.R. § 52.5 (2011). 
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impact on its field,” which “is a function of . . . the importance of the topic,” 
defined as “the significance and innovation of the research problem — its 
ability to move the frontier of knowledge forward.”26 
One of the two studies –– the one designed by Yoshihiro Kawaoka, 
Ph.D. –– was conducted at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and 
involved recombinant DNA (rDNA) methods.27 The research team clipped a 
gene from a H5N1 cell and “stitched” it together with genes from a human 
H1N1 virus cell.28 Research, like Dr. Kawaoka’s that uses rDNA techniques, 
is subject to NIH Guidelines which instruct the research institution not to 
permit any such research unless it has first been reviewed and approved by 
an Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC).29 An IBC consists of at least five 
members, including two community members, who collectively have 
“experience and expertise in recombinant [DNA] technology and the 
capability to assess the safety of recombinant [DNA] research and to identify 
any potential risk to public health or the environment.”30 The University of 
Wisconsin-Madison’s IBC that reviewed and approved Dr. Kawaoka’s 
study31 had 17 members, 15 of whom were employed by the University as 
faculty or staff.32 
An IBC’s review determines the level of biosafety laboratory standards 
that should be applied to proposed research pursuant to NIH’s rDNA 
Guidelines (Guidelines).33 These Guidelines specify for IBCs the level of 
biosafety standards to be employed based on the biological material on 
which the research is being conducted.34 When the research involves H5N1 
and when it could result in creating a more virulent and less treatable form 
of influenza, then more stringent biosafety standards might apply than 
provided for in the Guidelines.35 In this case, an IBC is instructed to refer the 
matter as a “major action” to NIH and its Recombinant DNA Advisory 
 
 26. How Reviewers Score Applications, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY & 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES, http://www.niaid.nih.gov/researchfunding/grant/strategy/Pages/5scor 
ing.aspx (last updated Aug. 1, 2013). 
 27. See Imai et al., supra note 15, at 427. 
 28. See Martin Enserink, Public At Last, H5N1 Study Offers Insight Into Virus’s Possible 
Path to Pandemic, 336 SCI. 1494 (2012). 
 29. See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING RECOMBINANT 
DNA MOLECULES (NIH GUIDELINES) 27 (2013), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/rdna/nih_ 
guidelines_oba.html. 
 30. See id at 26. 
 31. See Imai et al., supra note 15, at 427. 
 32. See UNIV. OF WISCONSIN, Institutional Biosafety Committee 2011-2012 Member 
Roster, http://www.ehs.wisc.edu/ibc.htm 
 33. See generally NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 29, at 13. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. at 21-22. 
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Committee (RAC).36 The University of Wisconsin-Madison’s IBC reviewed Dr. 
Kawaoka’s study proposal, but the IBC did not refer the proposal to NIH 
and RAC for federal review, even though the research team proposed 
creating a new strain of H5N1 that was virulent and much more 
transmissible among humans than what otherwise occurred in nature.37 
Instead, the University of Wisconsin’s IBC approved the study locally and, 
with that approval, the research began.38 
In both of the studies, researchers created a new pathogen through 
genetic manipulation of a naturally occurring H5N1 virus.39 They then 
infected laboratory ferrets with the new pathogen.40 Ferrets are considered 
to be a good model for human influenza infection because, like humans, 
ferrets can spread seasonal influenza.41 The researchers next observed that 
the genetically modified H5N1 was transmitted to uninfected ferrets.42 It was 
through this observation that the researchers concluded it was possible for 
an avian H5N1 strain that infected a mammal to undergo genetic changes 
so as to also become easily transmissible among those mammals.43 
The researchers also discovered that very few genetic changes may be 
necessary to convert an H5N1 strain capable of leaping the species barrier 
to infect a human into a strain that is also capable of airborne transmission 
between humans.44 Each of the two research teams found only four or five 
genetic changes between the H5N1 strain with which they started and the 
modified H5N1 that was easily transmitted between the ferrets.45 This led the 
researchers to their final conclusions that avian H5N1 is not incapable of 
making the genetic changes necessary to become easily transmissible 
among humans, and that those genetic changes may be so few as to justify 
the view that an H5N1 pandemic is a real public health threat.46 
 
 36. See id. at 32. 
 37. The article describing the Kawaoka Study describes the review and approval it 
received, and, while it refers to the University of Wisconsin’s IBC review and approval, it does 
not describe any review by NIH or RAC prior to the start of the research. See Imai et al., supra 
note 15, at 427. 
 38. See Imai et al., supra note 15, at 427. 
 39. See Herfst et al., supra note 15, at 1538; Imai et al., supra note 15, at 423. See also 
Martin Enserink, Controversial Studies Give Deadly Flu Virus Wings, 334 SCI. 1192, 1192 
(2012). 
 40. See Herfst et al., supra note 15, at 1536-37; Imai et al., supra note 15, at 423. 
 41. See Herfst et al., supra note 15, at 1536-37; Imai et al., supra note 15 at 423. See 
Nicole M. Bouvier & Anice C. Lowen, Animal Models for Influenza Virus Pathogenesis and 
Transmission, 2 VIRUSES 1530, 1549 (2010). 
 42. See Herfst et al., supra note 15, at 1539; Imai et al., supra note 15, at 424. 
 43. See Herfst et al., supra note 15, at 1539; Imai et al., supra note 15, at 427. 
 44. See Herfst et al., supra note 15, at 1539, 1541; Imai et al., supra note 15, at 427. 
 45. See id. at 1539; Imai et al., supra note 15, at 424. 
 46. See Herfst et al., supra note 15, at 1541; Imai et al., supra note 15, at 427. 
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Each of the research teams drafted their experiments, results, and 
conclusions and submitted their articles for publication. One of the articles 
was accepted for publication in Science and the other in Nature.47 Just 
before publication, however, the journals’ editors became concerned that 
publication of these studies posed a bioterror risk.48 The editors sought input 
from NIH and its National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) 
as to whether the publication of the studies created an unacceptable 
biosecurity risk.49 The concern was that the publications could provide a 
blueprint for creating a lethal and transmissible pathogen that could be 
misused for terrorism.50 NSABB reviewed the studies and recommended that 
both journals publish only redacted versions to eliminate the description of 
how the research teams created the new pathogens they studied.51 
NSABB’s recommendation started a firestorm of controversy.52 At issue 
was the value of these research findings to influenza scientists and public 
health officials who sought to prepare for an influenza pandemic, as 
compared to the risk that the research posed to national security.53 
Once it became clear that the new pathogens had not been lethal 
among the ferrets in either experiment, and that the methods of the 
experiments were available as a result of earlier published papers and 
presentations at scientific conferences, NSABB reversed itself.54 It 
recommended that both journals publish each of the articles without 
redaction.55 The articles were published later in 2012.56 
 
 47. See Franz, supra note 2, at 11. 
 48. Robert Roos, Fouchier Study Reveals Changes Enabling Airborne Spread of H5NI, 
UNIV. OF MINNESOTA CTR. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESEARCH & POLICY (June 21, 2012), 
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2012/06/fouchier-study-reveals-changes-ena 
bling-airborne-spread-h5n1. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. See also Kenneth I. Berns et al., Adaptations of Avian Flu Virus Are A Cause 
For Concern, 482 NATURE 153, 154 (2012). 
 51. Franz, supra note 2, at 41. Press Release, Nat’l Inst. of Health, Press Statement on the 
NSABB Review of H5N1 Research (Dec. 20, 2011), available at http://www.nih.gov/news/ 
health/dec2011/od-20.htm. 
 52. See, e.g., Pallab Ghosh, H5N1 Research Censorship ‘Problematic,’ BBC NEWS (May 
2, 2012, 1:01 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-17914706; Jack Shafer, Why Are We 
Censoring Bird Flu Science? REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/jackshafer/ 
2011/12/22/why-are-we-censoring-bird-flu-science/; Arthur Caplan, When Censoring 
Science Makes Sense, CNN.COM (Dec. 21, 2011, 7:54 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/ 
21/opinion/caplan-flu-science/index.html; Josh Fischman, Dangerous Bird-Flu Papers Should 
Be Partly Censored, Federal Panel Says, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 20, 2011), 
http://chronicle.com/article/Dangerous-Bird-Flu-Papers/130140/. 
 53. See Fischman, supra note 52. 
 54. See Franz, supra note 2, at 42. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See Herfst et al., supra note 15. See Imai et al., supra note 15. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
138 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 7:131 
B. The Discovery Imperative and Bias in Science 
To the scientist, “discovery is everything.”57 That is how Harvard 
biologist Edward O. Wilson, Ph.D., describes it. Scientists, he says, “know 
the first rule of the professional game book: Make an important discovery, 
and you are a successful scientist . . . . You go into the textbooks.”58 It goes 
deeper than success and fame, however. Discovery drives the scientist at an 
emotional level. It is “thrilling,” Dr. Wilson says.59 “There is no feeling more 
pleasant, no drug more addictive, than setting foot on virgin soil.”60 
Meanwhile, if, as a scientist, you “[f]ail to discover . . . you are little or 
nothing in the culture of science, no matter how much you learn and write 
about science.”61 
If Dr. Wilson is to be believed, then discovery is an imperative in the 
professional ethos of science. As such, it demands of researchers a single-
minded zeal to add to the body of scientific knowledge. To punctuate his 
point, Dr. Wilson borrows a quote: “The scientific method is doing your 
damnedest, no holds barred.”62 
Such “investigative zeal”63 leads, in turn, to a professional bias toward 
conducting research and blinding scientists to the risks that an experiment 
can pose to the public. It is a close kin to what others refer to as a “White 
Hat Bias” in science; a “bias leading to distortion of information,” which, in 
the case of DURC, is a protocol’s risks and benefits “in the service of what 
may be perceived to be righteous ends.”64 Because it arises from the 
profession’s imperative to discover, this bias affects not only the scientist 
who designs and conducts an experiment, but also every other scientist who 
might have a role in reviewing the experiment for funding or for institutional 
approval.65 In short, this bias of the profession travels from one degree to 
another with each and every scientist no matter the role he or she plays, if 
any, with respect to a particular experiment.66 
 
 57. Edward O. Wilson, Scientists, Scholars, Knaves and Fools, 86 AM. SCI. 6, 6 (emphasis 
added). 
 58. Id. at 7. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Wilson, supra note 57, at 6 (quoting, without citation, PERCY W. BRIDGMAN, 
REFLECTIONS OF A PHYSICIST 535 (2d ed. 1955)). 
 63. I borrow this phrase from Professor Richard Saver. Richard S. Saver, Is it Really All 
About the Money? Reconsidering Non-Financial Interests in Medical Research, 40 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 467, 469 (2012). 
 64. Mark B. Cope & David B. Allison, White Hat Bias: A Threat to the Integrity of Scientific 
Reporting, 99 ACTA PAEDIATRICA 1615, 1615 (2010). 
 65. See Saver, supra note 63, at 468. 
 66. See id. 
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In particular, the discovery imperative creates a bias among scientists to 
overvalue the benefits of an experiment and to undervalue its risks, even 
among scientists whose roles are limited to participating in the institutional 
review of an experiment proposed by a colleague. The bias is so pervasive 
that one experienced chair of an Institutional Review Board (IRB) wrote 
about it. He observed that researchers on IRBs “share a constantly 
reinforced bias for experimentation per se,” which, he said, “normally 
follow[ed] the socialization of scientists.”67 This professional bias, the author 
opined, created a real “potential for inappropriate overvaluation of benefits 
over risks . . . .”68 Other commentators have found additional anecdotal 
evidence of such a bias.69 For example, Professor Richard Saver describes 
instances in which investigators conducting human subjects research and the 
IRBs that approved the research have been criticized for allowing the 
researchers’ “investigative zeal” to result in subjects being exposed to 
potentially unjustifiable research risks, even in the absence of financial 
conflicts of interest.70 
All of the above suggests that the ever-present bias associated with the 
discovery imperative could have been at work during the design, funding, 
and institutional approval of the ferret studies. It certainly would explain why 
there were several lost opportunities prior to the onset of the research to 
account for the dual use risks of each study and to assure that they were 
more than offset by research benefits. For example, the discovery imperative 
can explain why the lead scientists on each of the studies designed their 
research protocols without expressly completing a dual use risk-benefit 
analysis. Likewise, it also can explain why the IBC that reviewed and 
approved Dr. Kawaoka’s study failed to account for the full measure of the 
biosafety risks of the experiment.71 
The discovery imperative and its associated biases also explain, at least 
in part, why a public policy that relies completely on scientists to identify and 
manage dual use risks is unsustainable. There must be some external check 
on that bias before we can expect the public to trust researchers and 
research institutions to manage DURC effectively. This provides one way that 
regulation generally, and the proposed federal rules for oversight of DURC 
in particular, play a vital role. 
 
 67. Peter C. Williams, Success in Spite of Failure: Why IRBs Falter in Reviewing Risks and 
Benefit, IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES., May-June 1984, at 1, 2. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Saver, supra note 64, at 469. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Imai et al., supra note 15, at 427. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
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C. Bounded Self-Regulation as a Means for Promoting Public Trust in 
Scientists 
As I have written elsewhere, regulating for trust is tricky.72 The law is a 
powerful vehicle for expressing and enforcing important social norms. It can 
signal to researchers and research institutions that they are obligated to 
protect the public from dual use risks that are not clearly justified by the 
benefits of that research which give rise to those risks.73 By creating a means 
to hold science accountable when its practitioners breach that obligation, 
the law can also provide a basis for the public to trust that science has a 
strong incentive to live up to its obligation.74 
For this to work, however, the law must tread somewhat lightly. If, in the 
hope of gaining greater compliance, the law takes primary control of DURC 
oversight, the entire effort to promote public trust in the research enterprise 
could backfire.75 By taking primary control of DURC oversight, the law 
would signal that scientists and research institutions cannot be trusted to 
sufficiently protect public safety.76 Why else would it be necessary to regulate 
them so completely? 
In the end, promoting public trust in researchers and research 
institutions to manage dual use risks requires the law to hit a regulatory 
sweet spot –– enough regulation to provide a foundation for the public to 
believe that scientists have a strong incentive to abide by the norm of 
protecting public safety, but not so much regulation as to signal that 
scientists are not sufficiently trustworthy to be given substantial authority to 
oversee DURC. A model for hitting that sweet spot is bounded self-
 
 72. See generally Robert Gatter, Walking the Talk of Trust in Human Subjects Research: 
The Challenge of Regulating Financial Conflicts of Interest, 52 EMORY L.J. 327 (2003) 
[hereinafter Gatter, Walking the Talk of Trust] (discussing regulating for trust in human subjects 
research); Robert Gatter, Faith, Confidence, and Health Care: Fostering Trust in Medicine 
through Law, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 395 (2004) [hereinafter Gatter, Faith, Confidence, and 
Health Care] (discussing the promotion of consumer confidence in healthcare) . 
 73. See Gatter, Walking the Talk of Trust, supra note 73, at 361-99. 
 74. See id. at 372-73. 
 75. See id. at 391-92. 
 76. See id. at 389, 392. Here is simple example that I shared when making a similar 
point in earlier writing: 
Data from Minnesota reveals that, when regulators announced their intent to audit a 
larger proportion of taxpayers and increase the penalties for evasion, the incidence of 
tax evasion rose. Meanwhile, when regulators announced that the voluntary 
compliance rate was high, compliance increased still more. Thus, taxpayers appear to 
interpret the law as a signal of the trustworthiness of their fellow taxpayers to voluntarily 
pay their fair share of tax. Laws increasing audits and penalties signaled that the public 
cannot be trusted to pay their taxes voluntarily. 
Gatter, Faith, Confidence, and Health Care, supra note 72, at 435. 
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regulation.77 Under this model, regulators set boundary procedures and 
standards by which a target of regulation must abide or suffer some form of 
legally mandated penalty.78 Within these boundaries, however, those who 
are subject to the regulations are permitted to exercise their own judgment 
about how to apply the boundary standards, and regulators defer to those 
judgments.79 
This regulatory technique is particularly useful where the goal of 
regulation is to signal the trustworthiness of the targets of regulation so as to 
increase public trust. Accordingly, it has a unique application in health law80 
where trust is viewed as exceptionally important.81 
The value of promoting trust in the context of scientific research is clear. 
Society needs the expertise of scientists to advance our collective knowledge 
about our world, which, of course, requires experimentation. Society might 
want to assess the risks and benefits of scientists’ experiments on a case-by-
case basis. Even then, however, it requires the expertise of scientists to 
identify those risks and benefits; to assess the probability that the risks and 
benefits actually materialize; and to place those risks, benefits, and 
probabilities into context for lay people. In short, there is no way to escape 
 
 77. See Gail Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the Medical 
Marketplace, 66 Mo. L. Rev. 341 (2001); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the 
Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2005); and Jody Freeman, 
The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV 543, (2000). “Bounded regulation” 
as I use it here is akin to “audited self-regulation” about which there is a significant literature. 
See Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory 
Technique, 47 ADMIN L. REV. 171 (1995); and Sunni Yuen, Exporting Trust with Data: Audited 
Self-Regulation as a Solution to Cross-Border Data Transfer Protection Concerns in the 
Offshore Outsourcing Industry, 9 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 41 (2007-2008). “Audited self-
regulation” is defined as “the delegation of power to a nongovernmental entity, by Congress 
or a federal agency, to implement laws or agency regulations, with powers of review and 
independent action retained by a federal agency.” See Douglas C. Michael, supra note 77, at 
176-77. Because phrase “audited self-regulation” in the strictest sense involves only a 
delegation of powers to another “entity” outside of government, I do not use the phrase here. 
Instead, I use “bounded self-regulation” to capture all of the aspects of delegation by 
Congress or a federal agency that retains powers of oversight, but also to encompass 
delegations to individuals, professions, and institutions that are not necessarily organized as a 
legal entity. For an example of a similar use of law to promoteself-regulation, see Agrawal, 
Resucitating Professionalism, supra note 77. 
 78. DOUGLAS C. MICHAEL, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL 
AGENCY USE OF AUDITED SELF-REGULATION AS A REGULATORY TECHNIQUE 5-6 (1993), available 
at http://archive.org/details/gov.acus.1993.audit 
 79. Id. at 5, 7. 
 80. See Agrawal, supra note 77, at 55; Gatter, Walking the Talk of Trust, supra note 73, 
at 361. 
 81. See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463 (2002). See also 
Gatter, Faith, Confidence, and Health Care, supra note 73, at 433. 
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our reliance on scientists to conduct experiments, as well as to help us 
determine whether the risks of research are worth the benefits. Given the 
reality of our reliance on the expertise of scientists, society needs a basis for 
trusting not only in the technical expertise of scientists, but also in their 
fidelity to our collective interests, which, at times, may mean halting the 
pursuit of discovery in the name of public safety. 
Given the importance of public trust in scientific research, it is not 
surprising to find the regulatory model of bounded self-regulation already in 
use. Medical researchers and their institutions have been deputized by 
federal law to review proposed research involving human research subjects 
to assure that the benefits of research outweigh the risks, and that human 
subjects participate on an informed and voluntary basis.82 Likewise, federal 
policy deputizes scientists and their institutions to review proposed research 
involving rDNA techniques to assure that the research will comply with 
applicable biosafety standards under federal guidelines.83 In each instance, 
procedures and standards are set by federal law and the task of 
administering those standards is delegated to researchers at the research 
institutions in which proposed research will take place if approved.84 
Research institutions that fail to abide by the boundary procedures and 
standards are subject to losing their eligibility for federal research funds,85 
which is a powerful incentive for compliance. In this way, these laws fall 
within the realm of bounded self-regulation because the law signals, 
through its delegation of authority, that researchers and research institutions 
are trustworthy, while also providing boundaries for the exercise of discretion 
and a substantial penalty for violating those boundaries. 
Using this model of bounded self-regulation does not guarantee 
success. Despite employing this model, the regulations both for protecting 
human subjects and for overseeing rDNA research are rife with flaws. Where 
the government regulates as a tool to promote public trust, the model of 
bounded self-regulation gives the government an opportunity to succeed 
where a command and control model does not. 
D. New Federal Policies for DURC Oversight 
In response to the ferret studies, the federal government developed two 
new policies for the oversight of DURC. The first policy was released on 
March 29, 2012 (2012 Policy),86 and it requested that all federal agencies 
 
 82. See generally 45 C.F.R. pt. 46(A) (2009). 
 83. See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 29, at 26. 
 84. Id. at 11. 
 85. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.122 (2009); NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 29, at 11. 
 86. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR 
OVERSIGHT OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN 1, 2 (2012), available at 
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conducting or funding life sciences research review their projects to 
determine if any involve DURC and to report their findings to the Assistant to 
the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.87 Additionally, if 
an agency finds that it is funding or conducting any DURC, the 2012 Policy 
provides that the agency should work with the researcher and research 
institution to develop a plan to mitigate the dual use risks.88 If those risks 
cannot be mitigated adequately, then agencies may take more extreme 
measures, such as classifying the research or terminating its federal 
funding.89 
The second policy is a policy in name only. From an administrative law 
perspective, it is proposed rule-making for which notice was provided and 
comments requested on February 22, 2013 (2013 Proposed Rules).90 The 
2013 Proposed Rules describe the DURC oversight responsibilities of 
researchers, research institutions, and federal agencies.91 Researchers would 
be obligated to assess whether their proposed research meets the definition 
of DURC and, if so, to work with the research institution’s review board to 
develop a dual use risk mitigation plan.92 If finalized, the 2013 Proposed 
Rules would require research institutions that receive federal funding to 
establish a board to review research proposals for the purpose of 
determining if they involve DURC and, if so, develop and enforce dual use 
risk mitigation plans for the research.93 The board may be internal or 
external to the research institution, and it may be a unique committee or an 
existing committee (such as an IBC) whose charge is expanded to include 
DURC oversight.94 The 2013 Proposed Rules do not require a particular 
make-up of the committee’s membership, so long as it has “sufficient 
breadth of expertise to assess the dual use potential of the range of relevant 
life sciences research conducted at a given research facility” and has 
knowledge of dual use issues, federal law, and available risk mitigation 
alternatives.95 Additionally, a research institution must notify the agency 
 
http://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/us-policy-durc-032812.pdf [hereinafter 2012 
DURC DRAFT POLICY]. 
 87. See id. at 3, 4. 
 88. See id. at 3. 
 89. Id. at 3-4. 
 90. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR 
INSTITUTIONAL OVERSIGHT OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN 11 (2013), 
https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/documents/oversight-durc.pdf [hereinafter 2013 DURC 
DRAFT POLICY]. 
 91. See id. at 4. 
 92. Id. at 8. 
 93. Id. at 10. 
 94. Id. at 11. 
 95. 2013 DURC DRAFT POLICY, supra note 90, at 11. 
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funding the research, if and when, the institution’s review board identifies 
the funded research as DURC, and it must provide that agency with a copy 
of the dual use risk mitigation plan developed by the institution.96 As for 
funding agencies, the 2013 Proposed Rules incorporate the powers and 
responsibilities described in the 2012 Policy.97 Any institution subject to the 
2013 Proposed Rules would risk losing its eligibility for federal research 
funding if it failed to comply.98 
The 2012 Policy and the 2013 Proposed Rules are positive steps to 
promoting public trust in scientists and research institutions conducting 
DURC, because they employ the bounded self-regulation model. Together 
they set boundary standards and procedures that will add to the 
accountability of researchers and research institutions with respect to the 
dual use risks that their research imposes on the public. First, they require 
researchers and research institutions to be deliberate in assessing whether 
their proposed research meets the definition of DURC and, if so, to identify 
the precise dual use risks at issue and then develop a plan of mitigation.99 
This diminishes the likelihood that proposed research will proceed on the 
assumption that the research does not pose any dual use risks or that dual 
use risks are simply a price of pursuing discovery. Second, they provide for 
the funding agency to make a fresh assessment of dual use risks and 
mitigation plans for DURC that they fund.100 Moreover, they empower the 
funding agency to classify research or even refuse to fund research that the 
agency perceives to have dual use risks that cannot be sufficiently 
mitigated.101 In this way, the agency’s review is a potentially powerful check 
on the ability of the researcher and research institution to identify and 
manage dual use risks effectively. It forces scientists and their institutions 
either to stand in the shoes of the funding agency when managing DURC, 
or risk that the funding agency will step in to manage or withhold funding 
for the research. 
At the same time, the 2012 Policy and the 2013 Proposed Rules rely on 
researchers and research institutions to take the lead in the oversight of 
DURC.102 They defer to the researcher and his or her institution to identify 
DURC and to develop plans for mitigation.103 Federal regulators override 
 
 96. Id. at 10-11. 
 97. Id. at 2, 13. 
 98. Id. at 6. 
 99. Id. at 10-11; 2012 DURC DRAFT POLICY, supra note 86, at 3. 
 100. 2013 DURC DRAFT POLICY, supra note 90, at 4. 
 101. Id. at 13; 2012 DURC DRAFT POLICY, supra note 86, at 3. 
 102. 2013 DURC DRAFT POLICY, supra note 90, at 6-7; 2012 DURC DRAFT POLICY, supra 
note 86, at 3-4. 
 103. 2013 DURC DRAFT POLICY, supra note 90, at 9; 2012 DURC DRAFT POLICY, supra 
note 86, at 3-4. 
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the institutional plan to manage DURC only where they find it significantly 
lacking.104 This leaves plenty of opportunity and an incentive for science to 
develop its own norms for protecting the public in the case of DURC. 
This is not to say that the 2012 Policy and the 2013 Proposed Rules are 
perfect. They are not. In particular, the 2013 Proposed Rules should instruct 
scientists and their institutions to not only assess and mitigate dual use risks, 
but to articulate why those risks, once mitigated, are justified by the likely 
benefits of the research. The rules should also identify whether research 
benefits must merely, clearly, or substantially outweigh dual use risks, and 
they should require that the institutional review process apply that standard. 
Finally, the 2013 Proposed Rules should do more than demand life sciences 
expertise on the institutional committees that review DURC. Those 
committees should be required to have a sufficient number of institutionally 
unaffiliated members to act as an additional check on the bias created by 
the discovery imperative. 
In the end, Dr. Franz and I agree that life scientists and their research 
institutions should not be over-regulated because doing so undermines trust. 
Yet, fear of over-regulation should not result in closing the door on all 
regulation. Instead, the answer is finding the right regulatory technique that 
allows scientists to regulate themselves within legal boundaries that help 
assure the public that the profession of science has a strong incentive to 




 104. 2013 DURC DRAFT POLICY, supra note 90, at 6-7; 2012 DURC DRAFT POLICY, supra 
note 86, at 3-4. 
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